The five habits that end badly

These aren't stylistic preferences; each one has a direct line to a deanonymization case study, and the pattern repeats often enough to be a rule rather than a suggestion.

  • Never type anything tied to your real identity into a market account, including old usernames you think are "safe now."
  • Never reach TorZon outside Tor Browser. A VPN alone does not anonymize traffic the way Tor's onion routing does.
  • Never log in over a network tied to your home or workplace when you can avoid it.
  • Never discuss market activity anywhere outside the market itself, including "trusted" group chats.
  • Never use a delivery address that traces back to you without an intermediary step.

Three tiers of OPSEC, and which one you actually need

Security effort should match what you're risking, not what sounds impressive in a forum post. Going straight to the advanced tier when the basic one covers your actual risk just means you'll skip steps out of fatigue.

Basic

  • Tor Browser on your regular OS, security level set to Safest
  • PGP for every message that touches an address or order detail
  • 2FA enabled on the account
  • A password used nowhere else

Intermediate

  • Tails OS booted from a USB drive, leaving no trace on the host machine
  • Monero instead of Bitcoin for anything that matters
  • A VPN before Tor, if your threat model calls for hiding Tor usage from your ISP
  • Public Wi-Fi instead of a home connection

Advanced

  • Whonix on a dedicated machine, isolating the Tor gateway from the workstation
  • XMR only, moved through an atomic swap rather than an exchange withdrawal
  • A burner device that never touches your personal accounts
  • A drop address with no direct link to your real one

Why "just use a VPN" isn't the whole answer

A VPN hides your traffic from your ISP; it doesn't anonymize you the way Tor's layered routing does, and it adds a third party who can see your real IP if you ever needed that guarantee to hold. Tor Browser's Safest setting disables JavaScript entirely, which removes the single largest attack surface used in real deanonymization exploits against Tor users. That's the setting that actually matters, and it's the one people skip because a few sites render worse without it.

Spotting a phishing clone before you type anything

Phishing sites copy TorZon's layout pixel for pixel. The layout was never the tell.
  • Use only the addresses listed on the TorZon link page, matched character by character.
  • Bookmark the address inside Tor Browser once verified; don't re-search for it every session.
  • Verify the operator's PGP signature before you log in, not after something feels off.
  • Never enter credentials on an address you found through a search engine ad or a forum link.
The rule that covers everything above

If something about a session feels off, stop. Close the tab, restart Tor Browser, and re-verify the address from scratch. Losing ten minutes to a false alarm costs nothing; losing your OPSEC to impatience costs everything the checklist above was supposed to prevent.